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Drew RendallAnimal cognition is a hot topic. How do we know
what other animals are thinking?
Well, actually, mostly we don’t. It’s still a young field
and a tricky one. We often can’t be sure even what other
people are thinking, even though we can talk to them
directly and share the same language. (‘Yuh, sure she
said that, but did she really mean it? What is she actu-
ally trying to tell me?’) And animals don’t talk, at least
in the usual sense, which makes it even tougher to know
what they’re thinking. Furthermore, many animal species
live very different lives from us, and so, as the
philosopher Wittgenstein famously cautioned, even if
they could talk, we probably would not understand what
they had to say.
Nevertheless, trying to understand the mental lives
of other species - to get inside their heads - is an
active and exciting area of research, and, notwith-
standing the above caveats, a lot of it, in fact, fo-
cuses on aspects of communication, sparked by the
example of research on bat echolocation by Donald
Griffin and others in the 1950s. They discovered
how it is that bats can navigate in the dark, and not
by special powers of vision, but by sound - by pro-
ducing a continuous stream of high-frequency ‘click’
sounds (that we humans can’t hear) while they fly
(Figure 1) and then listening for the portions of
these clicks that get reflected (echoed) back off ob-
stacles in the environment. This work helped to illu-
minate the dark world of the bat and it catalyzed
the modern era of research on animal thinking -
what is often now labeled ‘cognitive ethology’. Fol-
lowing Griffin’s lead [1], one entire branch of this
field focuses on studying the communication systems
of other species, believing as he did that these offer a
privileged window into the workings of their minds.Correspondence: d.rendall@uleth.ca
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stated.So what have studies of communication told us
about the minds of other species?
Well, as the example of bat echolocation itself
showed, some other species are likely to have mental
lives very different from ours. They see the world
very differently and probably think very differently
about it as a consequence. Bats effectively ‘see’ in
sound (although they can also see) and they navigate
in the dark by ‘talking to themselves’. Exactly what
kinds of thoughts they might have about the world
remains an open question, but, given their very dif-
ferent experience of the world, whatever thoughts
they have (if any) are likely to be quite different,
possibly almost unimaginable to us as a grounded,
visually dominated species [2,3].What about animals more like us? Aren’t they
more likely to see the world and think about it
similarly to the ways we do?
That’s certainly a sensible intuition that is partially
supported. For example, another landmark study in
cognitive ethology concerns research on vervet mon-
keys, which are small African primates. These monkeys
are vulnerable to a variety of predators, including leo-
pards, eagles, and large snakes, and studies in the
1970s and 80s found that the monkeys produced diffe-
rent alarm vocalizations in response to each [4]. When
other vervets heard the alarm calls of their compa-
nions, they automatically engaged escape responses
that were different and appropriate for evading a leo-
pard, an eagle or a snake even if these listeners had
not themselves yet seen and identified the particular
predator involved. It was as though the alarm calls
on their own told others everything they needed to
know, serving in effect as symbolic labels for the dif-
ferent predators much like our own human words
for ‘leopard’, ‘eagle’ and ‘snake’. So, here was a case
where a species more closely related to humans
seemed to see the world and to communicate about
it much as we do. This was exciting not just forThis is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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Figure 1. Bats navigate and identify prey by echolocation.
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cation and thought might exist in a species other
than our own but also for what this fact suggested
about the deep history of complex thought and lan-
guage in humans. In other words, it might help us
to understand another species better, and it might
also help us to understand ourselves better.So what do vervet alarm calls actually tell us
about the deep history of human thought and
language?
Well, the evolutionary origins of complex language
and cognition in the human lineage are another hot,
and hotly debated, topic, susceptible to many of the
same problems that plague studies of animal think-
ing and more [5]. It’s hard enough to ascertain what
others around you are thinking, whether animal or
human. It’s harder still when your subjects are fossil
species long extinct. How do you reconstruct the
thoughts of long dead ancestors? Here, the vervet
alarm call story offered a promising lead. Contrary
to some evolutionary scenarios that assume a very
recent origin of symbolic thought, language and cul-
ture in humans, the evidence for symbolic communi-
cation in vervet monkeys - with whom we share
only a very distant primate ancestor - suggested that
the cognitive foundations for these abilities might bevery deep indeed, long preceding our transition from
monkey-like primates to human ones.
Does this mean human language and cognition
are not as special as we often assume?
Not necessarily. Accumulating evidence since the
original vervet work now points to some fundamen-
tal differences in the capacity for symbolic thought
and communication in nonhuman primates com-
pared to humans. For example, more recent studies
of vervet alarm calls suggest that important details
of the original work need to be revised and that the
symbolic capacity of the monkeys’ calls may be fun-
damentally different from that of human words.
These newer findings align with a large body of
other research comparing the cognitive underpin-
nings of human language and primate communica-
tion [6].
In humans, language use is fundamentally intentional,
in two senses. It is intentional in the formal philosoph-
ical sense that language users make implicit assumptions
that the other people they interact with are mental
agents, like themselves, with thoughts and beliefs about
the world. It is also intentional in the more colloquial
sense that speakers deliberately mean, or intend, to share
what they know about the world, and influence what
others think and know about it, through the use of
words that codify thoughts and beliefs. In contrast,
Rendall BMC Biology 2013, 11:108 Page 3 of 5
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7007/11/108intentionality in both senses is largely absent in nonhu-
man primates, with the possible exception of some of
the great apes [7]. In general, primates do not under-
stand each other as mental agents with thoughts and
beliefs, or knowledge about the world. Nor do they com-
municate with the intent of sharing or providing infor-
mation about the world to others. In short, they seem
not to know what others know about the world, or even
that others might know things about the world at all.
They therefore also fail to appreciate that what others
know can be affected by one’s own communications [8].
So, in a fascinating paradox, the alarm calls that vervet
monkeys produce function to alert, or inform, others
about the presence of dangerous predators, but the effect
is inadvertent or unwitting. The monkeys themselves
do not understand the effect their calls have.
So are there other important differences between
human language and primate communication?
Yes, there are. Human languages are organized hie-
rarchically, with short and relatively meaningless
sound units (phonemes) combined to form longer
meaningful (symbolic) words that are strung together
into even longer meaning-bearing phrases and sen-
tences, and, of course, words, phrases and sentencesFigure 2. Nonhuman primate vocal repertoires typically contain a rel
syntax. (a) The right-hand panel shows a spectrogram of a long sequence
approaching and attempting to handle a young infant. Although this is a l
produced throughout the bout. Rather, the same call is simply repeated ov
calls produced by a juvenile baboon that has been forcibly ejected from a
broad-band, noisy vocalizations with some more harmonically structured v
vocalizations in this bout exhibit tremendous structural variety, they are no
sequence is notable for being completely unpatterned, or chaotic, and thu
functional in the contexts in which these calls are produced [9,10].can be recombined endlessly to create an infinite
number of different messages. In contrast, closely re-
lated nonhuman primates have relatively small signal
repertoires with specific vocalizations produced singly
or in short bouts without obvious patterning or se-
quencing that affects the messages produced
(Figure 2).
Does this mean primates are a lot simpler than
we tend to think?
Possibly, but not necessarily. It might mean only that
the signals they use are simpler and less diverse because
they serve relatively broad social functions. Many pri-
mates are intensely social. Who you are and what your
relationships are to others in the group are critical, and
the importance of particular relationships can vary de-
pending on the social context. In this kind of setting, the
messages conveyed by vocalizations might be relatively
straightforward, perhaps simply announcing your iden-
tity - in effect, simply reminding others who you are
[11]. But complexity might then arise in the variety of
responses that can flow from such announcements for
others based on their relationship to you and to others
in the group and how those relationships are best priori-
tized in the particular social context involved. Thisatively small number of different call types and little evidence of
of ‘grunt’ vocalizations produced by an adult male baboon while
ong sequence of vocalizations, there is no variation in the calls
er and over many times. (b) A spectrogram of a long bout of distress
feeding site. In this case, the young baboon produces a long stream of
ocalizations interspersed towards the end of the bout. The
t simply a single type of call repeated over and over. However, the
s evincing no evidence of syntax, which nevertheless may be
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appear to be especially adapted. So, it’s possible that the
relatively sophisticated social-inferential abilities of pri-
mates have effectively relieved signalers from having to
develop a larger, more complex repertoire of signals to
convey many different messages. Perhaps for primates,
the onus of communication is on listeners more than
on signalers. Primates do, after all, have large brains
and we have to assume all that brain tissue is thereFigure 3. The signal repertoire of the house wren. In contrast to the sig
house wren (Troglodytes aedon) (a, left panel), a common songbird, is div
from Western Canada, the repertoire consists of 27 different types of syllab
or in some cases three different individual notes. These syllables are then s
multiple different syllable types. Within a song, each syllable type can be re
Further, there are consistent patterns in which syllable types co-occur with
panel) for the 10 most common song types for Western Canadian wrens, t
values between syllable types within each song correspond to the transitio
in the syllable constitution and syllable transition patterns of song types cofor a reason and doing something. Still, it remains an
important puzzle to solve.
Is language unique then in being hierarchically
organized and having complex recombinatorial
properties?
Not exactly, because, although most primates do not
manifest these characteristics, they are present in the
communications of an entirely different group ofnals of the baboons illustrated in Figure 2, the signal repertoire of the
erse and highly structured [15]. In this example, from a population
le (a, right panel), where each syllable type is composed of one, two,
trung together in longer songs that involve the concatenation of
peated several times before switching to the next syllable type.
in songs and in what order they typically appear. (b) Templates (right
hree of which are illustrated in the spectrograms in the left panel. The
n probabilities between successive syllable types in a song. Regularities
nstitutes a rudimentary syntax.
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namely birds. Birdsong has long been noted for its struc-
tural complexity (and resulting aesthetic beauty) and
recombinatorial properties. In fact, there are a number
of instructive parallels to language. For example, bird
song is also hierarchically organized, composed of a rep-
ertoire of different notes that are joined in different
combinations into discrete syllables that, in turn, are
combined in regular patterns, sometimes called phrases
or motifs, which themselves can be mixed and se-
quenced into long song themes in rule-governed ways
reminiscent of the grammatical or syntactical rules that
structure the complex statements of language (Figure 3)
[12,13]. The paradox of birdsong is that its tremendous
structural variety and grammatical sequencing do not
seem to support any great variety of messages. In gen-
eral, birdsong serves two major functions: attracting
mates and repelling rivals. And both functions may be
served by a common message of, once again, simply an-
nouncing identity, but doing so in diverse ways that re-
veal additional characteristics of the signaler that are
relevant to mates and rivals. There is some suggestion
that songs can differ in different contexts in ways that
might support some diversification of messages [14],
but, in general, the structural complexity and recombi-
natorial properties of birdsong appear not to yield a
large number of different messages in the same way
these characteristics do in human language. And why
this might be the case is another outstanding puzzle to
be solved.
What’s the most important lesson to draw from
this history of research?
Arguably, the most important lesson is that the evolu-
tionary process can yield a complex and sometimes sur-
prising mosaic of outcomes. As the examples of
communication and cognition in humans, primates and
songbirds nicely illustrate, closely related species with
more similar histories (human and nonhuman primates)
are often similar in many respects. But they can also
be very different. The psychological intentionality that
undergirds complex language in humans, and distin-
guishes it from the communications of nonhuman pri-
mates, also supports a variety of other complex human
traits, including our capacity for pedagogy, for empathy,
and for broad-scale cooperation, all of which might also
prove unique to humans [6]. So, it’s a mental difference
that makes a difference. At the same time, very distantly
related species, with divergent evolutionary histories
(humans and songbirds), are usually quite different but
they can be surprisingly similar in some respects. There
is nothing yet in the corpus of general evolutionary prin-
ciples that would lead us to expect in advance that the
communication systems of songbirds would have somuch in common with human language. Why there is
such communicative convergence between songbirds and
humans remains an important puzzle to be solved, but
one thing we know is that it has also produced some
interesting convergences in the way bird and human
brains are structured and organized (despite their vast
differences in size).
Ultimately, both the similarities among species and
their differences are equally informative in our efforts to
understand the organization and evolution of various
kinds of minds. But the mosaic pattern of outcomes
we’ve seen so far certainly reminds us that there can be
a host of different solutions to life’s common problems
and therefore myriad evolutionary paths species can
take. In exploring these possible paths, it’s important
that we, as researchers, not pre-judge the places they are
likely to lead, or allow our human biases and expecta-
tions to color what we think we see in other species.
We may be in for a lot of surprises yet.
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